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Contrasting Political and Techno-economic Perspectives on Energy 
Policies in Bangladesh 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper assesses whether selected power sector policies in Bangladesh may have 
been subject to excessive political interference in contrast to rational and open decision-
making approach. This is done by comparing techno-economic assessments with 
populist narratives on the merits and demerits of three specific policies. While the 
populist narrative is critical of all three policies, techno-economic assessments are less 
conclusive and some aspects are explained by the context in which the policy planning 
has occurred. The paper reflects on the differences between populist narrative and 
techno-economic assessment and suggests how an awareness of their differences may 
inform future planning. 
 
Keywords: Power sector policies, Populist narrative; Techno-economic; Quick Rental 
Power Plants; Policy-making; Rampal Power Plant, Bangladesh 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper explores whether selected power sector policies in Bangladesh may have 
been subject to party/political interest rather than rational and open decision-making 
approach. Bangladesh offers an interesting case study. In contemporary literature, 
Bangladesh has been cautiously labelled as a ‘success story’ (Gardner, 2012; Lewis, 
2011; Van Schendel, 2009) and recently achieved lower Middle-Income Country status. 
Once described as a basket case for development, against many odds, Bangladesh now 
features frequently in global economic forecasts with a GDP of almost $221 billion 
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(2016). Bangladesh’s GDP growth is 7.1% (2016) and GDP per capita is $1359 ($3319 
PPP), according to the World Bank (2017). Business Monitor International (BMI, 2016) 
identifies the country as one of the ten emerging markets for the future of the global 
economy. Bangladesh’s development successes are attributed to the country’s 
progressive government (Hashemi, 1995), vibrant civil society (Kamruzzaman, 2014; 
Devine, 2006), sizeable donor community (Wood, 1994; Lewis, 2011; 1993, Khan, 
2013) and an active business community (Werner, 2009; Belal, 2008). However, 
Bangladesh’s recent success is underpinned by a paradox in which strong economic 
performance and improved social indicators co-exist with what has been described as a 
dysfunctional political system and predatory bureaucracy (Devine, 2009; Lewis, 2011). 
This has a significant bearing on Bangladesh’s policy architecture. As Rashid (2014) 
insists, the role of the bureaucracy in policymaking is undermined by excessive political 
influence. This could be due to a decline in bureaucratic capacities but bureaucrats often 
lose objectivity in policymaking as undue political inference and partisan interests (as 
an outcome of incentives created by patronage politics) override neutral expertise 
(Aminuzzaman; 2013; Rashid, 2014).  
There is a wider consensus that Bangladesh’s socio-economic progress is dependent on 
its ability to generate power and make best use of other natural resources. For example, 
a vibrant ready-made garment sector that generates significant income from 
international trade, and self-sufficiency in food production are often mentioned as 
indicators of Bangladesh’s recent success. Both these sectors heavily rely on reliable 
power supply. To continue its progress in various aspects of socio-economic as well as 
human development, Bangladesh thus needs to ensure that the supply of electricity is 
consistent with its fast growing demands (Uddin and Taplin, 2008). This sets the 
background for this paper to critically examine power sector policies to understand 
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whether these policies were based upon nationally appropriate reasoned evidence or 
other interests. Three specific policies are considered in depth: Quick Rental Power 
Plants (QRPPs), Rampal Power Plant (RPP), and the planned increase in the proportion 
of electricity to be generated by coal-fired power plants. Generally speaking, 
policymaking is not a mere technical matter, but the rational and open approach of 
policy making also takes socio-political contexts into account. For the selected policies 
discussed in this paper, these issues (technical, economic, political) are examined in 
turn, presenting the policy from a technical and economic (henceforth techno-economic) 
perspective and then presenting the populist narratives that outlines the political 
perspectives in more detail. In contrasting and complementing techno-economic and 
political narratives, energy policies in Bangladesh can be viewed through a more 
holistic lens in evaluating whether the selected policies of Bangladesh are made based 
on technical reasons, or other broader political interests or the combination of both.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section provides a conceptual 
framework outlining how political interests may influence policymaking followed by a 
brief methodological note clarifying how the techno-economic reflections and populist 
narratives were developed. This is followed by a section in which both techno-economic 
perspectives and populist narratives are presented in turn in a discursive format (i.e. 
without necessarily agreeing fully with the alternative viewpoint) for the selected 
polices, before contrasting them in the analysis section. Finally, a concluding section 
draws these insights together and offers some recommendations in the hope that these 
would add to the debate on whether i) policy problems are solely a technical matter, or 
ii) a combined approach that incorporates bespoke socio-political context as well as 
reasoned technical and economic arguments is necessary in order to find suitable policy 
options in a local context. 
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Conceptual Framework 
In analysing a particular policy, it is imperative to perceive whether policymakers can 
act independently and objectively. To illustrate, it is important to understand i) whether 
policymakers can identify a problem without any bias (such as interest of a class/social 
groups, region), and ii) the intention of the state (whether the state intends to expand its 
power and wealth, or it wishes to enhance material benefits for particular groups (e.g. 
elites, political parties/factions etc.) and non-material values) (Haas, 1992). Policies and 
their formulations are not a static or mechanical task. Policymaking and policy choices 
are closely tied to available resources and power relations of several actors involved in 
the process (Clarke, 2002; Gastelum Lage, 2012). Rather than the logical outcomes of 
rational selection procedures of best policy alternatives, policies are often formulated 
and implemented in particular social and historical contexts. These contexts matter in 
understanding why particular issues are put on the policy agenda, and why specific 
policies are developed (Mooij, 2007). While this might be applicable more widely, 
socio-political and historical contexts might also include the agenda of the donors and 
other political patrons, especially in developing countries. Policymaking, mainly in 
Western countries, can be focused on state-centred approaches (where policymakers and 
their interests determine the goals and content of public policies) and society-centred 
approaches (where interest groups or class based organisations mobilise to influence 
public policy), (see Grindle and Thomas; 1989, Sutton, 1999; and Keeley and Scoones, 
1999 for a detailed discussion about these approaches). The processes of policymaking, 
in recent years, have broadened beyond the state and engagements from civil society 
groups and non-governmental organisations are heralded as useful good practice 
(Lewis, 2018).  However, in many developing countries, policymaking process and 
capacity for effective policymaking are not the same as in Western countries (Conteh 
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and Ohemeng, 2009), and Bangladesh is no different (see above). Alongside the actors 
included in state-centred and society-centred approaches (such as bureaucrats, 
politicians, community groups, everyday citizens and various networks among these 
actors) “epistemic communities play a role in articulating the cause-and-effect 
relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the 
issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points 
for negotiation” (Haas 1992:2). Incorporating views from diverse actors through 
reasoned arguments and in a transparent manner thought to represent openness in 
policy-making. While it can be argued that openness is an integral component of 
contemporary policymaking, Vigar and Healey (2002) insist that openness has become 
instrumental in environmentally respectful planning. Wolsink (2007) asserts that open 
and environmentally respectful policies offer a new dimension in contrast to 
technocratic and corporatist styles of policymaking carried out by economic, scientific 
and political elites. The conventional technocratic approach to policymaking involving 
state, bureaucrats, and policy elites often benefits capitalists. Here the governments 
need the capitalists and capitalists need the government. To illustrate, capitalists often 
need the government to adopt policies that will provide them with physical 
infrastructure, access to low cost capital and help obtaining access to scarce land or 
natural resources (Whitfield and Burr, 2014). Whereas, other scholars (such as Lewis, 
2018; Mosse and Lewis, 2006) argue to break this conventional cycle and humanise 
policy processes through more participatory and ethnographic methods (Lewis, 2018 
identifies this as ‘methodological populism’) in order to supplement formal 
technicalities with people’s experiences and different narratives.   It is argued in this 
paper that the aspects of environmentally respectful planning and the call for 
humanising policy processes are closely linked with power sector policymaking in 
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Bangladesh. As with its economic progress, rapid urbanisation and massive population 
Bangladesh now faces a number of environmental challenges (such as sea level rise due 
to climate change, industrial waste, river pollution, power and energy crises and cognate 
challenges in increasing power generating capacity). In the first instance, many of these 
challenges may appear technical but, along with the policy implications, they are also 
inherently political.  
 
Methodology 
Before presenting discursive accounts of techno-economic perspectives and populist 
narratives for selected power sector policies in Bangladesh, this section describes how 
these perspectives were developed.  
Populist narratives in this paper are based on secondary sources of analysis. Instead of 
directly observing, or interviewing, or asking someone to fill in a questionnaire for the 
purposes of research inquiry, secondary sources of analysis deals with something 
produced for other purposes. This is an example of indirect observation, as the research 
subject is not affected (Robson, 1993). Evidence from academic sources as well as 
articles published in related topic in national (Bangladesh) newspaper, international 
media and other online platforms were used. Although academic sources carry wider 
credibility, newspapers and contents from other digital platforms (such as reports from 
research organisations, think-tanks, and NGOs) are also important research resources 
for academics across the humanities and social sciences as valid sources of information 
in their own right, and can act as a litmus of broader social, political and cultural trends 
(Deacon, 2007). The broad scope and consistency of their coverage, as well as their 
wider availability, makes these sources especially attractive as credible source(s) of data 
(Oliver, Cadena-Roa and Strawn, 2004). Relevant articles (N=162) and columns from 
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Bangladeshi newspapers such as The Daily Star (English) and The Prothom-Alo 
(Bengali) were used in order to follow the emerging narratives regarding the selected 
polices in Bangladesh. Additionally, related word search on Google and the library of 
the University of Bath, UK were employed. Items (e.g. journal articles, newspapers, 
book chapters, blogs, research reports) were carefully selected to reflect those are 
closely related to the policies being analysed. In developing the populist narratives 
presented in this paper, these arguments and evidence were summarised before being 
combined and contrasted based upon qualitative content analysis. 
 
The techno-economic reflections were based upon a two-stage process. Firstly, 
literature was gathered regarding the techno-economics and background to the three 
policies. The analyses in the collated literature were then critically assessed and 
compared to the assertions presented in the populist narratives.  
 
In some cases, the relevant literature took an appropriately national perspective to its 
analysis and so comparison to international norms (e.g. by converting local prices and 
comparing to regional and global averages) was instructive. In some cases it was 
necessary to compare the context (operational and in terms of assumptions about the 
future) in which the techno-economic assessments were performed to the context in 
which the assertions proposed by the populist narrative were developed. For example, 
system development may not have occurred as planned or planning may have been 
updated to address previous uncertainties or perceived weaknesses. Here, additional 
quantitative analysis was used to reassess the conclusions of reports in the light of 
updated context that is now available. Specifically, price projections for different fuels 
(such as natural gas, coal, and liquid natural gas) were converted to comparable units 
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and adjusted according to relative efficiency of their respective generation plants in 
order to provide a clear comparison between them. Similarly, information about the 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions of each generation type (per unit of electricity 
generated – the “carbon intensity”) was used alongside the proposed generation mixes 
in order to determine the potential difficulty of achieving Bangladesh’s commitments 
under the Paris agreement. In some cases, it was instructive to expand upon specific 
technical requirements of the power system that are potentially missing from the 
populist narratives. At the same time, the collated techno-economic literature was 
examined critically and omissions or inconsistencies noted before assessing whether 
they bear on the comparison being undertaken. This included searching for concerns 
that are identified but not fully or adequately addressed by the techno-economic 
literature.  
Techno-economic Analysis and Populist Narratives on the selected 
Policies 
This section provides discursive accounts of techno-economic analysis and populist 
narratives on selected power sector policies in Bangladesh. Below, these policies are 
discussed in turn with the populist narratives following techno-economic perspectives. 
Policy-1 - Quick Rental Power Plants 
Background  
Bangladesh has long been suffering from power generation shortages – for example, 
around 800MW (compared to peak demand of over 9000MW) as recently as 2015 
(Rahman n.d.). The government of Bangladesh has employed “quick rental power 
plants” (QRPP) to partially mitigate this shortfall, along with an increasing share of 
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other rental plants more recently (see Table 1).  
- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
The QRPPs are privately owned and typically liquid-fuel fired, in contrast to the 
predominantly publicly owned gas-fired plant that has characterised the power 
generation sector so far. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) claimed that no option 
was available other than installation of liquid fuel based rental power plants in the 
shortest time available. Under the short term plan, oil based power generation 
contributed about 1300 MW out of total initial rental power plant capacity of about 
1700 MW. The narrative of the GoB to justify this was that due to the persistent gas 
crisis and uncertain prospects of domestic gas sector development, a strategic decision 
to diversify primary fuel supply was critical for the sustainable development of the 
power sector. 
However, the higher price (per unit of electricity) and emissions associated with QRPPs 
has received criticism and led to conclusions that their selection was largely influenced 
by political cronyism or similar corrupt practices. 
Reflections on Narrative from Techno-economic Perspective 
The price (per unit of electricity) and emissions associated with QRPPs are relatively 
high. However, there are several reasons that their use could be considered part of a 
coherent plan.  
Bangladesh has long suffered from power shortages that have caused problems for 
domestic users and also an economic penalty (estimated at around 0.5% of GDP – 
Gomes, 2013). So addressing this shortfall is a valid aim. Within the 2010 Power 
System Master Plan (PSMP), the QRPPs were seen as a short-term option, with more 
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efficient plant coming online and replacing these rental plants where possible. This 
development takes some time but while there has been a significant increase in other 
generation capacity, this has been slower than planned for and so supplementary 
generation (through rental power plants) still helps to minimise shortages. There are 
additional factors such as a lack of availability of natural gas and transmission 
constraints that also contribute to power shortages  (Rahman, n.d.). It appears that many 
of the QRPPs and other rental power plants have been located to provide grid support 
(i.e. alleviating the transmission constraints) as well as reducing shortages more 
generally (e.g. see BPDB, 2015), but more detailed temporal and geographic analysis of 
loads would be needed to confirm their efficacy.  
Electricity prices in Bangladesh have historically been low, partially due to direct public 
subsidies and effective subsidies in the price of natural gas. This has tended to 
emphasise the high price of the QRPPs electricity generation, which although high, is 
not so high compared to unsubsidised electricity.  
The QRPPs tend to have greater use during peak demands – that is, their capacity factor 
is typically quite low relative to other generating plant. Figure 1 provides a stylised 
profile of the different generation types used throughout the day (based on the grid in 
Bangladesh at the end of 2016 - BPDB 2017b). In this illustrative example, the peak 
generation from oil fired plants is half that from gas fired plants (2100MW cf. 
4200MW). However, generation from oil-fired plants is less even and so the total 
generation from oil fired plants is less than one quarter of that from gas fired plants 
(20GWh cf. 89GWh). This contributes to a higher per unit price being demanded for 
electricity from the oil-fired plants, but it should be noted that their share of total costs 
(and environmental impacts) will be somewhat lower than a simple comparison of 
generating capacity might imply. 
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- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
The selection of QRPPs and the allocation of their contracts may have suffered from the 
inappropriate political influence proposed by populist narratives (see below) but the 
prices associated with these units and their characteristics do not, alone, conclusively 
show this.  
Populist Narratives on Quick Rental Power Plants 
For Ali, Faruk and Das Gupta (2012) dependency on fuel for the QRPPs is very 
dangerous for Bangladesh. Instead of improving the power shortage, according to them, 
QRPPs have worsened the situation because the supply of oil is not always possible. 
The QRPPs were supposed to be temporary, quick and advantageous for the 
Government. But critics claim that this has been a harmful step for the country as the 
Government have kept the rental power plants despite the big difference between 
subscriber’s fee and government spending in this venture.
It is argued that the Government is facing an economic crisis to meet the expenses of 
providing fuel to the QRPPs (and other rental power plants). It is believed that the GoB 
has already fallen into a 'subsidy trap' to run furnace oil-fired and high-cost diesel power 
plants and is left with no option other than spending a substantial amount from 
country’s financial reserve (for importing additional diesel and furnace oil). For 
example, it is estimated that the government had to pay around Tk. 90 billion in subsidy 
to the state-owned power body the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) in 
the fiscal year (FY) 2011-12 for purchasing electricity mainly from high cost diesel and 
furnace oil-based RPPs and QRPPs. The amount of subsidy required for the 2012-13 
FY was double than previous year’s cost; equivalent of one-third of total revenue 
(Sultana 2016, Ali, Faruk and Das Gupta 2012). There has been another spin-off, to 
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minimise the impact of financial loss on account of power generation, the Government 
has also increased fuel price and taken further initiatives to increase power tariffs 
(Financial Express, Bangladesh 2011). 
This is where the aspect of political consideration and influence is significant, as 
described in the populist narratives. There are allegations of corruption about the 
QRPPs. Critics insist that favourable deals were struck for the political cronies 
regarding QRPPs and that the Government is forced to pay huge amount of money in 
subsidies to the owners of these plants (Islam, 2016). Moreover, the government has 
incorporated an ‘indemnity’ clause in the Expeditious and Enhanced supply of Power 
and Energy (special provision) Act 2010. The Act stops any legal action against the 
government official(s) concerned in the matters of allowing [quick] rental power plants 
and other irregularities, if there are any (Sultana 2016) – adding further suspicions to the 
popular criticisms of corruption in the setting-up and running of the QRPPs. 
Policy-2 - Rampal Power Plant 
Background 
A relatively large (1.3GW) coal fired power plant is planned for construction in Rampal 
(Bagerhat, Bangladesh). This location is near to a globally significant mangrove forest 
(the Sundarbans) and has attracted significant public opposition. It is suggested that the 
location and type of plant have been selected on the basis of political allegiance to India 
and the inappropriate intervention of coal supplying interests. 
Reflections on Narrative from Techno-economic Perspective 
Impacts associated with the Rampal Power Plant (RPP) scheme can be considered in 
terms of those that would occur regardless of the location of the power plant and those 
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that are specific to the location. In general, the development of coal-fired power plants 
such as RPP is consistent with the Power Sector Master Plan (BPDP 2010), (albeit that 
it is significantly larger than the initial tier of 600MW plants that were proposed). 
However, the location-specific impacts associated with RPP are more problematic. 
The official Environmental Impact Assessment for the plant (CEGIS, 2013) attempts to 
address some concerns relating to the location but it has been subject to considerable 
criticism from experts relating to ambiguities and issues that are not adequately 
addressed (ibid. especially volume III, covering comments and responses). The 
assessment (ibid.) does outline some advantages for the Rampal site over an alternative 
in Khulna area but does not provide meaningful discussion of other options further 
afield. Rampal is situated such that power transmission to Khulna (3rd largest city, 
population around 700,000) is relatively short but given that higher capacity 
transmission towards Dhaka (the capital) is also likely to be required (Rahman, n.d.), it 
seems unlikely that this advantage rules out other locations.  
Some risks are poorly represented by simplified analysis (Stirling, 2010). It is likely that 
this applies to some of the concerns relating to RPP, given the uncertainty/disagreement 
relating to the significant hazards they might present. In particular, the potential for 
ecological damage has been noted as a cause for significant concern by UNESCO given 
the unique status of the Sundarban region (Doak et. al., 2016). Concern has also been 
raised over the vulnerability of the proposed location to hazards such as cyclones 
(Sharda and Buckley, 2016).  
It is possible that inappropriate influences have resulted in this location being selected 
but without further information, it is also not obvious why this hypothetical influence 
would favour the Rampal location over one that would (presumably) not have been so 
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controversial or unpopular with the general public or internationally. 
Populist Narrative on Rampal Power Plant 
The RPP project has generated significant criticism from the public and civil society 
urging the government to relocate this power plant (similar to the call of the UNESCO 
and other international organisations). Nationally and internationally, there have been 
large protests against this project. Civil society organisations, activists and others 
protesters (including in the social media) opposing this project assert that government 
has acted stubbornly because of political reasons with neighbouring India1, despite 
knowing that the RPP will have cataclysmic effect on the Sundarbans and its bio-
diversity. To elaborate, the RPP is a partnership between the Bangladesh Power 
Development Board and India's state-owned National Thermal Power Corporation 
(NTPC), which will share ownership of the plant, as well as the electricity it would 
produce. The GoB insists that the Plant “will suck up 9,150 cubic meters of water from 
the Poshur River every hour and run it through a desalination plant. However, since 
mangroves depend on a brackish mix of fresh and salt water, scientists and critics not 
only fear that water levels in the Poshur river will run low, but also that the blend of 
fresh-and-salt water could be disrupted, dooming swaths of the Sunderban’s 
mangroves” (cited in Hance 2013). Hance (2013) also observes that “water dumped 
                                                        
1 This is visible from the following: "coal is big business in India, and no doubt there 
are powerful interests at play," says Ashish Fernandes, an expert on coal with 
Greenpeace India. "If Bangladesh is locked into a coal-dependent energy paradigm, 
companies like NTPC will make significant profits, at the cost of [Bangladesh’s] people 
and environment" [cited in Hance, 2013] 
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back into Poshur River will be up 20 to 25 degrees F warmer than the river water, 
threatening aquatic species”. Leading international environmental organisations have 
raised similar concerns. For example, in 2016, the World Heritage Centre and 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) conducted a monitoring 
mission to review potential impacts from the construction of the RPP “assessing risks 
from climate change, and evaluating the overall management system of the Sundarbans, 
including provisions around shipping safety2. The mission visited the proposed site as 
well as the locations of a cargo vessel accident in 2015, and, [the location of a] oil spill” 
in 2016. The mission convened meetings with key ministries, industry representatives, 
port authorities, researchers and local community members. The report concludes that 
“the proposed Rampal Power Plant poses a serious threat to the Sundarbans”. The 
IUCN report (Doak et. al. 2016: 3) also identifies four key concerns: “pollution from 
coal ash by air, pollution from wastewater and waste ash, increased shipping and 
dredging, and the cumulative impact of industrial and related development 
infrastructure”.  
While the critics, civil society organisations and international organisations such as 
UNESCO and IUCN are persistently voicing their concerns about the damaging impact 
of the Rampal project, the GoB (including Ministers, and Advisers to the Prime 
Minister) insist that the most advanced technologies will be used to mitigate possible 
risks for Sundarbans and therefore there is no scope to retreat from this project 
                                                        
2 On 18 October 2016, the World Heritage Centre and IUCN call for relocation of 
Rampal power plant, citing this as a serious threat to the Sundarbans (see 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1573). More information provided by Doak et. al. (2013) 
  6 
(Prothom-Alo 2016a). To illustrate, Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury, an adviser to the Prime 
Minister in an interview explains that “the Rampal Power Plant would be built using the 
latest ultra super critical technology, so it would not affect the environment of 
Sundarbans” (cited in Hance 2013). Such claims have been rejected by civil society 
organisations and commentators such as Uddin (2016) who insists that supercritical 
technology is outdated and has “been superseded by the more modern and efficient 
‘ultra-supercritical’ (USC) technology”. He goes on to explain that, “contrary to the 
claims of the Bangladeshi government, the Rampal Power Plant is bound to produce 
high levels of carbon dioxide and waste-water discharges. It is also likely that Rampal 
will in fact be run using poor quality coal imported from India, which spits out lots of 
ash without creating much energy” (ibid). Moreover, reports by NGO network 
Banktracks (2015), and Sharda and Buckley (2016) claim the RPP project takes no 
account of the potential for industrial accidents, transportation incidents, tidal waves 
and other natural disasters in the region. Further concerns were raised by Human Rights 
organisations about the displacement of families and the occupation of land in adjacent 
areas. For example, a report from the South Asians for Human Rights (2015) show that 
fishermen, woodcutters and honey collectors have already lost their livelihoods as a 
result of displacement and encroachments onto their lands.   
 
At this stage one might also raise the question how these narratives are viewed by the 
people of India (who also share parts of the Sundarbans) and more broadly by the 
international community. There have been protests against the RPP project 
internationally including by the people of India (The Daily Star, 2016). International 
organisations such as UNESCO, Greenpeace, and IUCN are also highly concerned 
(Rahman, 2017; The Daily Star 2017). At the time of writing this paper, Norway’s 
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sovereign wealth fund has taken out Indian industrial giant Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd 
(Bhel) that was awarded the contract to build the RPP, from its investment portfolio due 
to environmental concerns. Moreover, there seems to be no rationale or credible plans 
on transporting coal for this large project. This suggests that risks for accidents will be 
high especially after a few major accidents in recent times (including sinking of several 
oil vessels close to the Sundarbans). Not only this, the GoB is violating its own law by 
permitting 190 industries (notably, manufacturing plants for cement, LPG gas and gas 
cylinder, oil refinery, brick-kilns, saline water refinery and welding factory) within the 
Ecologically Critical Area (ECA) of the Sundarbans3. Critics argue that these are the 
satellite industries of the RPP project and possess serious threat to the bio-diversity of 
the Sundarbans (Daily Star, 2018; Prothom Alo, 2018).  
 
Given this context, Anu Muhammad, a Professor of Economics, and the Member 
Secretary of the Committee for Protecting National Fuel and Gas, insists that the 
government is not driven by scientific evidence, logic, public interest, and its 
                                                        
3 The GoB declared the 10-kilometre periphery of the Sundarbans as the ECA in 1999, a 
couple of years after the Unesco listed it as a natural world heritage site. As per 
Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act 1995 (amended in 2010), no one is 
allowed to set up any factory in the ECA. According to a report published in the 
Daily Star (2018), out of the 190 industries, 181 have already obtained the 
environment clearance certificate and the other nine the site clearance certificate 
from the Department of Environment (DoE) over the last several years. The report 
also insists that at least 24 of the industries fall under the ‘red category’, meaning 
those are extremely harmful to the fragile biodiversity of the Sundarbans. 
  8 
responsibilities for environmental challenges. He strongly argues that policies should be 
made based on evidence and reasoned arguments, yet that no evidence is being 
presented by the Government or the NTPC as to how the challenges, raised in national 
and international studies, will be mitigated (Anu 2016). He also claims that apart from a 
handful of politicians and ‘experts’ who will directly benefit from the RPP project most 
people are against this project (Prothom Alo 2017). 
Policy- 3 - Gas or Coal Emphasis in Electricity Generation Planning 
Background 
Electricity generation in Bangladesh has been predominantly gas fired, taking advantage 
of Bangladesh’s reserves of natural gas. However, the 2010 Power System Master Plan 
(PSMP) outlines the intention to transition to a generation mix in which coal fired plants 
generate around 50% of electricity (with gas generation forming 25%) by 2030 (BPDB, 
2010).  
Reflections on Narrative from Techno-economic Perspective 
The 2010 PSMP was updated in 2016 (BPDB, 2016). Both plans use an “Economic, 
Environmental and Energy security” (EEE) assessment approach and aim to provide a 
vision for the Bangladesh power sector with a holistic perspective. The 2016 plan 
presents a clearer approach to weighting the assessment criteria and, along with other 
updated information, recommended an electricity mix with 35% gas-fired generation 
and 35% coal-fired generation. The report notes sensitivity in its findings to future 
changes in the price of renewables and suggests that this role can be reviewed at 
appropriate intervals.  
Some criticism of the prominence of coal-fired generation in the PSMPs relates to its 
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perceived higher costs; in contrast this is presented as a factor favouring the use of coal 
in both PSMPs. This apparent contradiction may be partially explained by noting that 
the main fuel used to generate electricity is domestically sourced natural gas that is 
presently supplied to the power sector at a subsidised price, well below international 
averages. However, at the current rate of extraction, known reserves are estimated at 
around 9-14 years (Rahman, n.d.). Furthermore, current gas supplies were estimated to 
be only two-thirds of total (met plus unmet) demand in 2011 (Gomes, 2013) and so for 
the role of gas to continue (and expand), supply will need to increase - potentially 
through a combination of offshore development and imports. The PSMPs assume that 
some transition towards imported liquid natural gas (LNG) will be required and that will 
significantly increase the costs. For example, the average end-user price for gas is 
currently 1.88 $/mm-btu, contrasting with LNG prices proposed for Pakistan (in 2013) 
of 17.7 $/mm-btu (OEIS, 2013).  
In fact, the price of LNG has dropped significantly since the preparation of the 2016 
PSMP (see Figure 2 - based on World Bank, 2017a4). This was not anticipated at the 
time of developing the PSMP and so it is understandable that the economic analysis 
underpinning part of the plan highly favoured coal. It should also be noted that LNG has 
historically exhibited higher price volatility than coal and this is likely to continue. 
However, with the carbon price adopted by the 2016 PSMP ($125/ton-CO2), using the 
new set of price projections from the World Bank would probably have led to the 
recommendation of a greater role for LNG under the methodology that was adopted. 
                                                        
4 Converted to price per kWh-electricity, based on nominal efficiencies of 45% for coal 
and 60% for CCGT. 
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For Bangladesh to achieve its commitments under the Paris climate agreement relating 
to its power sector5, would be very challenging under the coal based mix advocated in 
the 2010 PSMP. However, it would be achievable (albeit still with challenges) within 
the range of cleaner options suggested in the 2016 PSMP. This target could be relatively 
straightforward with a grid generation mix that is even more similar to the present day. 
- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
Although it is clear that a reassessment of the proposed planning is appropriate, the 
conclusions made at the time could be justified by the criteria and information they 
were made under and so a techno-economic analysis on its own is unlikely to provide 
strong evidence of any inappropriate influence on the decision making relating to this. 
Populist Narrative on Gas or Coal in Power Generation in Bangladesh 
Despite growing demand for power and natural resources to generate more power, there 
are no visible improvement in increasing domestic capacity through new exploratory 
excavations or enhancing the capability of state-owned organisations such as 
Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration and Production Company Limited (BAPEX) and 
Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation (shortly named as Petro-Bangla). There 
are also little attempts to explore new gas field since the find in Rupgonj in 2014. A 
similar picture can also be found in terms of exploring gas fields in the Bay of Bengal or 
                                                        
5 Around 91MtCO2e from 190GWh reducing to around 75MtCO2e  (assuming growth 
projections hold) 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Bangladesh%20First/INDC_2
015_of_Bangladesh.pdf  
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exploring new coalmines within the country. One reason for this is the significant 
differences of opinion regarding which foreign company should get permission from the 
government to conduct further exploration along with BAPEX (Prothom-Alo 2016b). 
While new coal based plants are under construction (e.g. Rampal), the country is 
becoming increasingly dependent on importing coal from other countries. Imam (2016) 
fears that by 2030, with the current trend, Bangladesh will have to import 90% of its 
coal. This will eventually require massive GoB funding and subsidies. He insists that, 
exploring less than ten gas fields in last ten years demonstrates gross negligence from 
the government and policymakers (ibid). 
While techno-economic analysis cannot conclusively support the allegation of political 
influence (see above), the populist narratives tend to suggest that the coal-based plants 
are favoured in the 2016 PSMP because this offers more opportunity for corruption. 
Powerful countries which are political allies of the GoB, and multi-national companies 
are trying to make money in Bangladesh. To do so, they are bribing the local politicians, 
policymakers and bureaucrats. Moreover, within the populist narrative, coal in power 
generation has been identified as a dangerous and hazardous option. To illustrate, for 
Huq (2017), coal has been the most polluting fossil fuel for generating power in large 
power plants. He insists that, in Bangladesh, coal does not offer a clean or suitable 
option, and the future of coal based power generation should come to an end as relying 
on an obsolete technology such as coal will not be in the best interest of Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless, there are also arguments within the populist narrative claiming that coal in 
Bangladesh’s five discovered coalfields is of very high quality, albeit with intense 
debate on whether, and how, this coal should be exploited. Rahman (2012), and Sajjad 
and Rasul (2015) describe some of the characteristics of the coal reserve region of 
Bangladesh and relevant issues of coal mining in the country. First, the locations of the 
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coalmines are densely populated, as is Bangladesh. Coal exploitation would require 
massive resettlement plans, a thorny as well as costly issue in land-scarce Bangladesh. 
Second, a thick layer (100m–200m) of soft, waterlogged sand lying over the coal 
reserves is “likely to create significant problems for exploitation of coal resources, 
whether mined by the open-pit or closed-pit method. In case of underground mining, 
this water layer would make the exploration process both complex and costly, with a 
high likelihood of flood and accidents during mining activities. In the case of open 
mining, there would be a need to pump out huge amounts of water, which could create 
environmental problems. Indeed, hydrological management will be a major challenge in 
both cases” (Rahman, 2012: 11). Third, the soil over the coal-reserve areas in 
Bangladesh is extremely fertile. Farmers use these lands for two or three crops a year, 
meaning that these locations provide a permanent livelihood to the farming 
communities, which could be irreversibly lost if over-ground, open-pit mining method 
is chosen. “These features, which are noted in the draft Coal Policy (2008) report, make 
coal mining in Bangladesh particularly problematic. The major policy debate in 
Bangladesh is on the one hand about the concerns options and modalities to explore its 
coal resources and on the other hand, the current and future energy needs and 
Bangladesh’s desire to ensure energy-security” (Rahman, 2012: 12). These issues 
represent an obvious policy dilemma. Particularly as in the GoB plan, the power 
generation capacity will reach about 40,000 MW by 2030, half of which would be 
produced in coal-based power plants. The amount of “coal required to produce 20,000 
MW of electricity would be 60 million tonnes per year. Most of the required coal will 
be imported from coal exporting countries like Australia, Indonesia or South Africa” 
(Imam, 2017). To what extent this will be a sustainable method poses a major policy 
concern in Bangladesh’s power sector policies despite the debate on which method 
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Bangladesh should adopt in order to utilise its coalmines. Moreover, Bangladesh having 
no experience for large-scale coal import has now chosen to develop coal fired power 
plants, based on imported coal. Unfortunately, the required volume of coal import (for 
the projected 9,000 MW power generation based on coal) “will not be possible without 
deep-sea port facilities and inland water route development. RPP itself will require 4.72 
million tonnes of coal import and supply to the power plant annually that has emerged 
as a major challenge for BPDB” (ibid). Therefore, coal fired power generation targets 
with imported coal may be a tricky choice and certainly not a popular one. It is argued 
by the critics that if future power plant constructions are not synchronized with fuel 
supply arrangements this will only create uncertainties in power generation. As Rahman 
(2014) argues, “the existing practices of haphazard developments will [further] increase 
cost of the energy and power project development that will ultimately trickle down to 
the common people.” 
Analysis 
Among the three policies considered here, different relationships can be observed 
between the techno-economic reflections and the populist narrative. In the case of the 
Quick Rental Power Plants (QRPPs), their conclusions differ. However, in the case of 
the Rampal Power Plant (RPP), they are quite well aligned. The overall planning of the 
electricity system is somewhat more complex and both perspectives highlight factors 
not really addressed by the other. 
The two perspectives differ somewhat in their conclusions regarding Quick Rental 
Power Plants (QRPPs). From a techno-economic point of view, the QRPPs appear to be 
a reasonable solution in the absence of viable alternatives and so while malpractice 
cannot be ruled out, it certainly is not an obvious conclusion. However, from the 
  14 
populist viewpoint, the continued use of QRPPs is considered proof of Governmental 
problems. In reality, both perspectives probably miss certain aspects of this issue. There 
is a political context that is not captured by technical analysis and may provide a 
different light on findings. The GoB’s inclusion of an ‘indemnity’ clause in the 
Expeditious and Enhanced supply of Power and Energy (special provision) Act 2010, in 
order to prevent any legal action against the government officials concerned in allowing 
or approving QRPPs might be interpreted as an indicator of corruption or wrongdoing. 
Conversely, the populist view is partially based on an underestimate of the technical and 
economic challenges associated with alternative solutions and subsidies given to power 
generation from gas. While severe power shortages are commonplace in Bangladesh 
and alternative mechanisms of power-generation are still under development, the 
popular narratives do not consider what alternatives might be viable.  
By contrast, in the case of RPP both perspectives identify that there are significant 
concerns regarding the proposed location. On one hand, while it is not possible to draw 
conclusions about the underlying motives for the location of RPP from the technical 
information presented, it also nevertheless hard to justify this choice. On the other hand, 
the populist perspective can go further to speculate on this and take account of 
additional contextual factors. Many of the concerns expressed in the populist narrative 
seem to reflect a lack of confidence in the GoB’s commitment to mitigation measures, 
rather than (or possibly in addition to) a lack of satisfaction with the technical details of 
these measures. For example, the populist view is that measures such as covering the 
coal, using cleaner coal, moving the fly ash and adopting a strict policy in transporting 
coal to avoid major accidents will not actually be adhered to. It is also possible that a 
lack of negotiation and openness in policymaking causes some concern. While both 
sides claim that their arguments are based on scientific evidence they are not discussing 
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nor resolving the points of disagreements. The GoB’s disregard of public protests as 
well as concerns from national and international organisations raises further concern 
regarding the Government’s determination to press ahead with the project without 
further consultations. Within the populist narrative, this is taken as evidence of a 
stubborn or dictatorial attitude while public policies should be open based on evidence 
and reasoned arguments taking public opinions and local contexts into account (see 
conceptual framework section). 
Finally, comparison between the perspectives regarding the future electrical grid 
generation mix is more involved. As a complex issue, it is reasonable to hope that both 
perspectives would present pictures that include a spectrum of positive and negative 
elements. From a technical point of view, the planning appears self-consistent and the 
suggested course of action is justified by the analysis that was completed to support it. 
Some aspects of the analysis could be explained more transparently but it is not clear 
how significant these elements are. Other aspects are outdated (due to developments in 
international energy markets) and it would be appropriate to revisit these. If there is 
excessive reluctance to review the planning in light of changing circumstances (notably, 
the changes in the price of LNG and renewables), that could be interpreted as an 
indicator that either the Government suffers from policy myopia or the allegations of 
material benefit as well as political patronage and inappropriate interest are legitimate. 
However, this should be balanced against the need to press ahead with developments – 
the lack of which also appears to be the source of some of the discontent expressed 
within the populist narrative. The related aspects of policy for coal and lack of 
exploration for new gas blocks both in-land and in the coastal areas also highlight that 
each perspective can take account of information that is not fully taken account of in the 
other. For the populist narrative, delays in decision-making and allegations of conflict 
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of interest in finalising the foreign companies both provide some form of credibility for 
the idea that bureaucratic red-tape is driven by self-interest. Traditional techno-
economic studies might tend more towards highlighting barriers such as artificially low 
energy prices as credible reasons, without necessarily reaching conclusions about the 
underlying reasons that these barriers continue to exist. Lack of progress by the GoB in 
developing alternative sources is a cause for concern but the two perspectives present 
alternative factors that may explain it. 
In general, it can be seen that techno-economic analysis tends to search for solutions to 
specific challenges with defined constraints. Arguably, the populist narrative is less 
subject to these constraints and as a result it is freer to propose possibilities outside of 
the scope of the techno-economic analysis, albeit with less regards to whether they can 
be technically realised. For example, in a Bangladesh context, allegations of corruption 
in setting up large infrastructural project are not uncommon6. It has been argued that 
many such decisions are made in Bangladesh based on non-policy aspects, as 
Governments may need political blessings from donors and external sources (Gardner, 
                                                        
6 For example, in one occasion, a Canadian company paid bribe to one of the ministers 
in 2005 (see, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/calgary-s-niko-resources-to-pay-
9-5m-bribery-fine-1.987297). In another incident, Chevron managed to pull out of 
Bangladesh and sold its business to another company after a major blowout on one gas 
field in Bangladesh – it is claimed that government officials and bureaucrats assisted 
Chevron in this regard (see http://www.theindependentbd.com/home/printnews/65637 
and http://www.thedailystar.net/bad-deals-make-bangladesh-vulnerable-25087 for more 
details).  
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2012). This means that a populist narrative may contend that these inappropriate 
influences have dictated a course of action even when techno-economic analysis would 
not. As Aminuzzaman (2013:455) insists, the “political leadership of Bangladesh has 
treated some of the major policies more as rhetoric than commitment”, and “the 
dynamics of public policymaking in Bangladesh … is either extensively influenced by 
donor conditions or external technical assistance”. 
Conclusions  
In some cases, it appears that techno-economic analysis has not fully taken into account 
the populist narrative. Long-term planning is necessary to provide stability, find 
optimum pathways and attract investment. This needs to be balanced against potential 
for political change. It also needs process of periodic review as situation changes (e.g. 
different technologies and prices, different constraints such as the Paris agreement, 
different availability and pricing of fuels, environmental concerns brought to light, 
changing demand from population and industry). 
It should be noted that the recommendations of techno-economic analysis are also be 
subjective (i.e. it is not just the political perspective). This is sometimes glossed over by 
the quantitative results that are presented (for any non-trivial system at least), but the 
quantitative results will still represent value-choices at some point in the underlying 
analysis. A key linkage between the two perspectives is that these value-choices could 
be highlighted more transparently and more explicitly linked to the politics of 
policymaking that dictates what they might be. For example, it may be agreed that 
protecting the Sundarbans is a worthwhile objective but it is still based upon a societal 
value choice. If the value of this objective were discounted then techno-economic 
analysis might suggest that the location for the Rampal Power Plant is appropriate 
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within the constraints adopted.  
 
Techno-economic analysis can only ever be as good or appropriate as the constraints 
that it seeks to satisfy, whereas a political narrative can think bigger and even if some of 
the conclusions are subsequently shown to be ill-founded, it can move the discussion to 
what it needs to be. A technically feasible approach might be undermined because of 
political context and so rather than continuing with its recommendations regardless, it 
may be better to recognise that the technical challenges and the political challenges are 
both real and both need to be overcome in different ways (albeit with appreciation of the 
insights provided by the other perspective). On the one hand, the political perspective 
can be used to establish the aims, objectives and constraints of projects, as techno-
economic analysis does not present tools that are adequate for this. On the other hand, 
the techno-economic analysis can determine the options and trade-offs that are likely to 
be encountered in pursuing these aims and that can then be evaluated in line with the 
priorities set according to a political framework. Effective locally appropriate policies 
have the potential to lift millions of people out of the misery of poverty and protect the 
environment. Clearly, policy problems are not purely technical matters. It requires 
careful political judgment about how to promote economic and social change in ways 
that stand the most chance of success (Addison, 2008:330). Competent technical 
analysis should not solely focus on technical matter but also consider assorted local 
contexts.  
 
Recommendations 
In some cases, key differences in conclusions can be partially explained by a lack of 
knowledge of each perspective by adherents of the other. Especially when both are 
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subject to change. Better communication of plans, updates to plans and the 
underlying reasons or justifications for them could help to resolve this. Care 
should be taken to communicate key points in a way that is appropriate to each 
audience. Therefore, it is contended in this paper that an effective policymaking model, 
taking local and national contexts into account, need to be open, accountable and 
humane.   
 
In a country like Bangladesh where good governance is still far from an acceptable 
level, and politics are often associated with violence and corruption, the overall policy 
architecture needs to be improved so that it reconciles the technical and humane inputs 
from various social actors including civil society organisations. Structural change 
towards positive direction may take time but the desired principles are known – namely, 
transparency, accountability, along with putting national interest above political agenda 
or the interests of particular groups such as elites or national agents of multi-national 
companies. Great humility would be required in this process, along with the ‘will to 
improve’ (Li, 2007). If achieved, this could help to foster an environment in which the 
underlying (and sometimes hidden) assumption of each approach are better aligned and 
so there is a greater possibility of them presenting similar conclusions. Rather than 
adopting a simple combination of the approaches, it is better to recognise that both 
techno-economic and political analysis of populist narratives address different needs, 
potentially targeting different audiences. The perspectives should be used to 
complement and inform each other. Simply combining the two may mean losing the 
specific insights of each. The technical approach will focus on what can be done now 
and might ignore the aspirations for things to be much better that are found in populist 
view; both are needed but trying to combine them might lead to diluting both.  
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Table 1: Power generation capacity in Bangladesh. Adapted from BPDB 
(2010, 2017a)  
 
 2011 Generation Capacity (MW) 2017 Generation Capacity (MW) 
Public Sector 3481 7138 
QRPP 250  
Other rentals (3 – 15yr) 609 2038 
Other private sector 1596 3375 
Imports  600 
 
  
  30 
Figure 1: Stylised power generation daily profile (based upon BPDB 2017b 
for end of 2016) 
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Figure 2: Comparison between coal and gas fuel price projections (based 
on World Bank, 2017a) 
 
 
 
  
